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1. Introduction 
Trade measures designed to offset competitiveness losses and carbon leakages have taken a 
high profile in European climate policy debates during the two first phases of the EU-ETS. The 
perspective of a failure of the Copenhagen COP 15 to reach a global deal for the Post 2012 period, 
jointly with unilateral efforts proclaimed by the EU to reach the 20-20-20 objective 
unconditionally, have reinforced the momentum over a border adjustment or compensation 
mechanism throughout the ultimate months of negotiation of the EU Climate and Energy 
package. Even though the original BTA was discarded while less aggressive forms preferred – such 
as free quota allocation and, albeit less clearly, offsetting import mechanisms - the final C&E 
package adopted during the Dec 08 EU Summit was clearly sealed from the perspective of a 
significant cost premium imposed by the carbon price on a wide spectrum of energy consuming 
industries. Event of carbon leakage is defined in Article 10(a), while measures to support 
energy-intensive industries are listed in Article 10(b) of the package. They include free allowances 
and the inclusion in the Community scheme of importers of products produced by the sectors or 
sub-sectors where leakages have been ascertained.  
Among the criteria for a sector to qualify for leakage-support, Article 10(a)§17 of the 
package specifies that “The list of sectors or sub-sectors exposed to a significant risk of carbon 
leakage shall be determined after taking into account, where the relevant data are available, the 
extent to which third countries, representing a decisive share of world production of products in 
sectors deemed to be at risk of carbon leakage, firmly commit to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions in the relevant sectors and within the same time frame to an extent comparable to 
that of the EU (…)”.What is a “firm” and “comparable” commitment is not defined by the EU. Still, 
pursuant to Article 10(a)§17, risk of carbon leakage might be discarded as long as large partner 
countries commit to significantly reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in the sectors 
considered. 
Against this background, the unilateral use of export restricting measures such as export 
taxes and VAT refund by China on energy-intensive sectors raises both hopes and concerns. From 
a European perspective, export restricting measures on products where China represents “a 
decisive share of world production” are likely to ease the competitive pressure faced by European 
import-competing industries, through both a quantity (import volumes decline) and price (world 
price rise) effect. Mirroring the BTA originally contemplated in the EU, trade restrictions on 
Chinese exports might hence have an effect on trade “comparable” to any border adjustment 
mechanism set in a large importing country. Concerns regard the exact amount to which these 
trade effects actually avoid leakages outside the EU, and as long as they are part of national 
commitment to reduce national emissions, can be deemed comparable to that of the EU. To what 
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extent EU import and China export adjustment mechanisms are “comparable” from a climate 
change perspective is the question raised in this paper.  
Focusing on steel, aluminium and cement where risks of leakage are deemed plausible and 
export restricting measures have been raised in China during the last couple of years, we assess 
the comparability of China and EU “commitment” through a proxy given by the EU-ETS quota 
price equivalent of China’s export restrictions set on energy intensive products. Our estimates of 
the EU-ETS quota price equivalent of Chinese exports restrictions provide figures of similar 
magnitude as the envisaged range of EU-ETS CO2 price, except for cement.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 recalls the basic figures of China’s trade and 
growth, as well as the definition and roles of export taxes and VAT rebates in the past. Section 3 
digs into current export taxes and VAT rebates on steel, aluminium and cement, providing 
updated figures of their level and a qualitative assessment of their effect on world prices and 
export volumes. We present in section 4 the basic formula of EU-ETS quota price equivalent of 
China’s export restricting measures, and its application to steel, aluminium and cement. We 
discuss the results in section 5 before conclusion. 
2. China’s “decisive” production, trade and growth 
2.1 GDP and trade: a brief overview 
China’s GDP has expanded at an average 8-9% growth rate during the last two decades, 
experiencing a two-digit performance from 1992 to 1999, and almost 10% growth thereafter 
(figure 1).  China’s trade performance shows a slightly different picture. The first trade boost 
occurred in 1994, when the annual growth rate skyrocketed at the historical level of 80.83%, 
while GDP was growing at 26.21% and 23.59% over the precedent years. Chinese trade then 
stagnated in 1996 and 1998 with an annual growth rate of 2.70% and -0.44%. Chinese imports 
and exports kept balanced on average until China joined the WTO (11 Dec 2001) after which 
China’s exports grew much faster than its imports. China’s trade surplus is now acknowledged as 
a determining factor of China’s buoyant GDP (with a contribution to GDP growth up to 4 
percentage points according to World Bank’s estimates) even though some controversies remain 
over the cause-effect relationship between export and GDP growth. The trade/GDP ratio 
expanded from 20% in the early 1980s to almost 50% in the early 1990s and after a slight 
decrease from 1993 to 1999, to more than 70% after 2005. In 2007, China’s exports almost 
account for 40% of its GDP.  
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Figure 1: China’s GDP and trade 1991-2007 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, Custom House. Unit: 100 million dollars. 
Note: trade value on yuan in 2007 with an annual average exchange rate of 7.6 yuan/dollar.  
 
2.2 Trade partners 
China’s major trade partners are concentrated. Its nine major trade partners were 
responsible for 76% of its 2.17 trillion dollar total trade value in 2007. The European Union (EU) 
ranks first, its bilateral trade with China accounting for 16% in China’s total trade (figure 2).  
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Figure 2. China’s total trade by major partner countries in 2007 
Unit: billion dollars.  Source: China Custom House. 
Note: ASEAN, Association of South East Asian Nations.  
 
The total bilateral trade between China and the European Union almost tripled (2.8 times) in 
five years between 2003 and 2007. In a similar fashion as China’s overall trade development over 
last years, China’s export to the EU grows much faster than its import from the EU during the 
2003-2007 period (exports more than tripled while imports doubled). As a result, China 
registered a net trade surplus of 134.2 billion dollars in 2007, seven times higher than the 19.1 
billion dollars trade surplus experienced in 2003 (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. China’s trade with the EU 2003-2007 
Unit: billion dollars. Source: China Custom House 
 
2.3 China’s exports restricting policies 
2.3.1 Export VAT refund 
The VAT export refund system, disallowing full recovery of the 17% input VAT, was adopted 
for the first time in 1985. The domestic VAT and export VAT refund rates were used for three 
categories: on coal and agriculture products (5-7%; 3%) industrial products (13%; 10%) and other 
products (17%; 14%). Five major modifications were added to the export VAT refund rate during 
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the Asian financial crisis when the Chinese products were facing possible competitiveness losses 
after poor performance in 1998. The export VAT refund rate was augmented gradually as a 
solution of getting out of the crisis: by July 1999, the export VAT refund rate of China’s major 
exporting products (clothing, electronic equipment, transport equipment and machineries, etc.) 
were up to 17%, a total reimbursement. Other products’ export VAT refund rates were 
augmented to 13-15%. Overall, the general average Chinese export VAT refund rate was fixed at 
15% at the end of last century. The third modification was set up pursuant to a notice (Cai Shui 
(2003) No.222) modifying the export VAT refund rate and proclaimed jointly by the Ministry of 
Finance and State Administration of Taxation on October the 13th 2003. This notice defined five 
categories of export VAT refund categories (17%, 13%, 11%, 8% and 5%). It became effective in 
January 2004 and reduced the average export VAT refund rate from 15.11% to 12.11%. The fourth 
adjustment on export VAT refund, which was initiated by a circular issued jointly by five ministries 
in September 2006, classified three modifications. The circular suppressed the export VAT refund 
for several natural resources and primary products. It reduced the export VAT refund rate on high 
polluting and energy consuming products. It also augmented the export VAT refund rate for 
commodities with high value added and technological content.  
After WTO accession, China’s boosting trade surplus has continuously fueled disputes with 
its trade partners. In an attempt to demonstrate China’s good faith in attempting to keep trade 
surplus under control, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the State Administration of Taxation 
(SAT) jointly issued Circular No. 90 on 19 June 2007 (which became effective since July the 1st, 
2007) which profoundly modified the VAT export refund scheme. It indeed reduced VAT refund 
rates for 2,831 commodities accounting for 37% of China’s tariff codes. As a result, the export VAT 
refund rates of 2 268 commodities deemed likely to trigger trade disputes were reduced by 2-8 
percentage points (See Table 1 below).  
Strikingly, the 2007 VAT refund rate reduction concentrated on energy consuming and high 
polluting goods in China. As a matter of fact, the idea of controlling the export of such products 
by the means of trade policy was frequently debated during China’s tenth Five Year Plan 
(2001-2005), when energy and environmental problems were given high profile for the first time 
and became “official issues” at the end of 2005, pursuant to a circular published by seven 
ministries3: [Fa Gai Jing Mao (2005) No. 2595]. The circular provided only guidelines and fell short 
of defining any implementation principles or rules.  
Export VAT refund rate reduction or complete withdrawal had been practiced only on a 
limited range of selected commodities since then. The government willingness to curb excess 
                                                             
3
 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), Ministry 
of Land and Resources (MLR), China Custom House, State Administration of Taxation and State Administration of Environmental 
Protection (former name of Ministry of Environmental Protection). 
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export on selected commodities was reasserted by the above-mentioned 2007 State Finance 
Circular [Cai Shui (2007) No. 90] which included a withdrawal or reduction of export VAT refund 
of 553 highly polluting and energy intensive commodities4. Previously, the export VAT refund rate 
applied on these commodities ranged between 5% and 13%, to be compared with the 17% 
domestic VAT rate.  
Table 1. Export VAT refund rate modification in 2007 
Mode of 
modification 
Types of 
commodities 
Comm
odity 
number 
Major contents 
withdrawal High polluting 
and high energy 
consuming. 
553 Distinguishing animals and their 
products, cement and mineral 
products, fertilizers and other chemical 
products, several activated carbon 
products, non-ferrous metal primary 
manufactures, etc. 
Reduction Commodities 
easily triggering 
trade disputes 
2268 Clothing, shoes, toys, plastic and 
its products, furniture, several steel 
products, low value-added electronic 
machineries, etc. 
Tax free  10 Stamps, nuts, canvas, etc. 
Source: Cai Shui (2007) No. 90. 
 
2.3.2 Export taxes 
Comparing to the export VAT refund policy implemented continuously – even though 
unevenly - by China over the last decade, export taxes are set on much more temporary basis. 
Usually, the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council jointly with the Ministry of Finance 
and State Administration of Taxation publishes next year’s export tariffs at the end of each year. 
Possible modifications may occur in the course of the year, with respect to unexpected 
development in domestic and/or international demand and supply balances.  
Extensively used by newly-independent countries in the 1960s and 1970s in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America (Devarajan, Go, Schiff and Suthiwart-Narueput, 1986), export taxes are a means to 
reach several potential goals. In her review of the role of export taxes in the field of primary 
commodities, Roberta Piermartini (2004) recalled that the rationale for an export tax applies to 
                                                             
4
 These include leather, chlorine, dyes and other chemical products, certain industrial chemicals (refined chemical products excluded), 
some fertilisers, metal carbide and activated carbon products, certain lumber and one-time-use wooden products, unalloyed aluminum 
poles and other non-ferrous metal processed goods, segmented ships and non-mechanical boats, etc. Consult ”Notice Regarding the 
Reduction of VAT Refund Rates for Certain Commodities” State Finance Circular [Cai Shui (2007) No. 90] for further information. 
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large countries: the cost of an export tax will be borne more by foreign consumers the more 
domestic producers manage to reduce exports and raise the world price of the exported 
commodity. To what extent a country is a large country – ie, a price maker – is given by the 
elasticity of the world demand facing the exporting country. A small – or price taker – country 
faces perfectly elastic world demand, while a large country does not. We’ll see below that on the 
products selected, China faces almost rigid demand, which confirms it as a large country. Roberta 
Piermartini further reviews the arguments for setting export tariffs in the large country case, and 
confronts them with a limited number of case studies (box 1).  
 
Box 1. Why should a country use export taxes? 
Piermartini (2004) enlists 7 arguments for a large country to use export taxes: 
 
The terms-of-trade argument 
 
Stabilisation of domestic prices, export earnings and income 
 
Controlling inflationary pressures 
 
The infant-industry argument 
 
Retaliating to tariff escalation in export markets 
 
Easing the challenges of government revenue collection 
 
Increase the income of the poor 
 
Piermartini further reviews the evidence on the basis of case studies, namely the case of 
copra in the Philippines, the Indonesian palm oil industry, the cotton and yarn markets in 
Pakistan, and the rice in Thailand. Environmental goals – or effects – only appear once, as 
negatives outcomes of export taxes in the case of forestry products in Indonesia.  
Source : Piermartini (2004) 
 
Interestingly enough, environmental concerns do not appear explicitly among the different 
justifications for an export tax in the economic literature reviewed. In China however, the 2007 
clearly states that one major use of such taxes was to further curb the export of highly polluting 
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and energy-intensive products, should the withdrawal of the export VAT refund fail to achieve its 
purpose. Sectors and sub-sectors of iron/steel, aluminum, copper and several other non-ferrous 
metals were hit by an export tax rate set between 5 and 25%. The export tax was also used to 
increase domestic supply on sectors facing protracted deficit. For example, the export tax rate of 
coal and coke increased from 25% in 2008 to 40% in 2009 and the export rate of fertilizers ranged, 
across products, between 100 and 150% in 2008.  
3. The use of export taxes and export VAT refund in EU-ETS leakage sectors 
We select three sectors highly where leakages under EU-ETS scheme are deemed plausible, 
namely steel, aluminium and cement. Not only have these sectors been deprived from VAT 
export refunding but they have also been imposed relatively high export tax (15% on average).  
World market conditions at the time when export taxes were set or raised and VAT rebates 
were cut were characterised by a widening of world supply/demand gap. Excess demand over 
supply boosted prices from 2006 on. Prices peaked in 2008 before retreating at the end of the 
year (figure 4). Without investigating the relationships between China export restraints and 
market upsurge at this stage, let us simply recall that a key determinant of China’s integration in 
world market on steel, aluminium and cement lies in available supply capacities China provided 
to match a rising and, as we will see, a rigid world demand – at least until it raised export taxes 
and cut VAT rebates. To quote the World Bank market outlook webpage, the “outlook for 
aluminium [and to a lesser extent, steel] prices depends critically on the pace of investment in 
new capacity (especially in China and the Middle East), as well as on the level of energy costs and 
deregulation of power markets”5. Aluminum—the one major metal whose price has not surged 
during the current cycle because of the growth of capacity in China, the World Bank adds— 
“became more expensive recently because of still-strong global demand and increasing costs of 
electricity, a major input to the production of aluminum. Even if new capacity is concentrated in 
areas with stranded, low-cost energy sources, such as the Middle East, there is limited downside 
potential for prices, because aluminum has been fluctuating near the upper portion of the cost 
curve”6. We’ll see that limited supply response to export taxes by Chinese competitors in world 
markets strengthens the overall impact of Chinese export taxes both on prices and indirectly on 
competitiveness and leakages outside the EU. But let’s examine first the steel, aluminium and 
cement trade and trade policies of China.  
                                                             
5
 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2009/Resources/10363_WebPDF-01Chapter1-w47.pdf 
6
 idem 
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Figure 4. Annual averages of Steel prices, Steel products index and Aluminum prices 
Left axis : price of Aluminium and Steel coilsheet in US$/mt 
Right axis : Steel products index (2000=100) 
 
3.1 Steel 
 
China is the world largest producer of steel (and iron). The annual growth rate of steel 
production is now much higher than the average growth of the overall industry sector (figure 4). 
Half of Chinese steel is made of raw steel, whose production process is more polluting and 
energy consuming than other steels.  
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Figure 5. China’s annual growth rate of GDP, industrial sector and steel sector 
Unit: %. Source: Bureau of Statistics of China.  
Note: Steel sector includes steel and raw steel. 
 
Though the first world producer, China export less than 5% of its total production. However, 
steel (and iron) export has grown much faster than output over recent years: Chinese steel (and 
iron) export achieved a tremendous annual growth rate of 139% in 2004 and 72.5% in 2006 
(figure 5).  
 
Figure 6. China’s steel production and exportation 2003-2007 
Unit: million tons for left axis and percentage for right axis. Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Custom House.  
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China’s steel exports to its 12 major purchasers account for more than three quarters of 
China’s overall steel exports in recent years. South Korea is the biggest importer of Chinese steel, 
followed by EU-15, with one third of China’s steel export share (Figure 6).  
  
Figure 7. China steel export and export partners, 2003-2008. 
Unit: thousand tons (left) million dollars (right). Source: China Custom House.  
 
The major exported commodities are final steel products. In 2007, these commodities 
accounted for more than 80% of total steel exports (Figure 7). 
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Figure 8. Steel export by types of commodities in 20077 
Unit: million dollars. Source: China Custom House. 
 
3.1.1 Export VAT refund and export tax 
The export VAT refund rate on steel (and iron) underwent little modifications in the 1990s. 
The refund rate was initially fixed at 17% which equals to the domestic VAT after the general tax 
system reform in 1994. The rate was cut to 9% from 1995 to 1998, and then raised to 15%. This 
first phase of reduction in export VAT refund was not motivated by environmental concerns. 
Major reforms of steel export VAT refund really started after 2004, when steel officially appeared 
in the category of highly polluting, energy and resource consuming products – China committing 
to reduce their exports from the beginning of the new century. As a result, the export VAT refund 
rate was reduced to 13% for all types of iron and steel8. A circular published jointly by the 
Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation at the end of the same year (Cai Shui 
(2004) No.214) seems to have triggered a number of large export VAT refund rate reductions. The 
circular suppresses export VAT refund on 16 categories of (crude) iron (HS code 7202) and two 
categories of aluminum which we will describe later9. Shortly after the circular came into force, 
China abolished the export VAT refund of nearly all crude irons and steels10 (Cai Shui (2005) 
No.57). 
In the beginning of the 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010), China strengthened its willingness to 
limit exports of high polluting and energy and resource consuming products. This resulted firstly 
in the reduction of export VAT refund rate from 11% to 5% for 142 types (HS codes at 8 digit level) 
of steel and iron from September 9th, 2006 (Cai Shui (2006) No. 139). This ample reduction was 
followed in November 1st, 2006 by the implementation of an export tax of 10% on 30 types of 
steel which are mainly primary products like crude iron, iron alloy and billet steel (cf. China 
Custom House Circular (2006) No. 63). A more vivid policy was announced less than half a year 
later, which became effective in April 15th, 2007 (cf. Cai Shui (2007) No. 64), whereby China 
reduced its export VAT refund rate for 76 types (HS codes at 8 digits) of steel (which are relatively 
high value added products like cold rolled steel, certain special steel, etc.) from 11% to 5% and 
abolished this refund for 83 other types (HS codes at 8 digits) of steel. Continuously from June 1st, 
2007 on, the promulgation of China’s Custom House (2007) No.22 has covered a larger range of 
export steels whose tax rate increased: 53 types of steel were imposed a 5% export tax rate 
                                                             
7
 Iron & its products include in HS four-digit 7201-7205, Steel & its primary products include 7206, 7207 and 7218, Rolled steel includes 
7208-7212, 7219, 7220, 7225 and 7226, Steel sticks and threads include 7213-7217, 7221-7224, 7227-7229. 
8
 All codes starting with 72 in HS system.  
9
 HS codes of the iron include precisely 72021100, 72021900, 72022100, 72022900, 72023000, 72024100, 72024900, 72025000, 
72026000, 72027000, 72028010, 72028020, 72029100, 72029200, 72029300 and 72029900.  
10
 HS codes include 7203, 7205, 7206, 7207, 7218 and 7224. 
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(coiled steel, plate steel, steel wire, etc.), 30 types of steel a 10% tax rate (normal steel bar, 
angular steel, etc.), the export tax rate reaching finally 15% for crude products (crude iron, 
certain iron alloy, billet steel and steel ingot etc.). The overall export tax rate on iron and steel 
increased by 10% at the beginning of 2008 and was maintained at this new level until the 
publication of a circular issued at the end of November 2008 by the Customs Tariff Commission of 
the State Council. It authorized the 2009 tariff policy entering into force from December 1st, 2008 
on, to set to zero export taxes on 59 types of steel and iron (8 digit HS codes) whose export tax 
rate ranged between 5% and 15% before modification. Most of such ‘released’ products are 
relatively more value added and less polluting products than those still eligible to the export tax 
regime. Raw and basic steel and iron products continue to face export tax rates between 15 and 
25%. 
Changes in the export tariffs of China’s steel export is illustrated by figure 8. The low and 
high lines define the sum of export refund rate (which is positive) and export tax rate (which is 
negative) as a cost (or net export tax) to the export sector. The lower line (blue) displays the 
lowest benefit a Chinese steel exporter can obtain from the export regime and the upper (red) 
line the highest one. The (green) line in between is the simple average of the high and low values. 
It shows a slowdown of tariff benefits from 2003 to 2008 and a slight rebound in 2009 as a result 
of the cancellation of about sixty steel products export taxes (8 digit HS code).  
 
Figure 9. Export tariff benefit changes, Chinese steel 2003-2009 
Unit: %. Source: authors’ calculation according to each period’s export tax and export VAT refund rate. 
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during the second half of 2005 and the first half of 2006. However steel export growth in the 
beginning of the second semester of 2006 and lasted until the end of 2007 when a more 
stringent export tax was imposed. This steel export decrease was sustained by a further increase 
in export tax in the beginning of 2008. As a result, steel export decreased in 2008.  
 
Figure 10. China’s monthly steel export volume 2003-2008 
Unit: 1000 tons. Source: China Custom House.  
 
 
Figure 11. Monthly growth rate of exported steel 2003-2008 (month over the same month of last year) 
Unit: %. Source: China Custom House 
3.2 Aluminium 
China primary Aluminum production almost doubled between 2004 and 2008, from 6.6 to 
an estimated 14 millions tons over the period, accounting now for 53% of world primary 
aluminum output. Trade in volume followed a slightly less sharp increase, while exports in value 
skyrocketed in 2008 at the climax of the raw material world market boom. Figures 11 and 12 
display the main destinations and components of China aluminum exports. 
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Figure 12. China’ Aluminum export (quantity and value) by countries of destination: 2003-2008 
Unit: 1000 tons (left) million dollars (right). Source: China Custom House. 
 
 
Figure 13. Components of China’s aluminum export in 200711 
Unit: million dollars. Source: China Custom House 
 
In 2007, only 2 out of the 18 types of aluminum at 8-digit HS codes level eligible to export 
taxes were effectively imposed an export tax, under HS7601-HS7606 subheadings, which refer 
mainly to non manufactured aluminum, the most exported goods including HS 7601 non forging 
rolled aluminum, HS7604 aluminum bars, sticks, and HS7606 aluminum plate thicker than 
0.2mm.  
                                                             
11
 Primary and unrolled aluminum includes HS7201-7203, Aluminum materials contains all forms of aluminum-made products, i.e., 
sticks, threads, foils, etc., with HS codes 7604-7610. Aluminum equipment includes tins, home using products, etc., with HS 
7611-7616.  
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3.2.1 Export vat refund and export tax in aluminum sector 
The export VAT refund rate of aluminum was substantially modified both in magnitude and 
range terms, and reduced from 15% to 8% and 13% 12  in October 2003 by the State 
Administration of Taxation. A series of small reductions of aluminum export VAT reduction have 
taken place ever since. The circular Cai Shui (2004) No. 214, denounced by Ministry of Finance 
and State Administration of Taxation, suppressed the export VAT refund of unrolled aluminum 
(HS codes 76011000 and 76012000) in January 2005. In September 2006, a reduction from 13% 
to 8% and 11% was adopted mainly for HS codes 7604, 7605 and 7606 (Circular Cai Shui (2006) 
No.139). From July 2007, another large modification was introduced: the export VAT refund rates 
of several aluminum products were suppressed (unalloyed aluminum stick, bar and tube etc.) and 
other aluminum export VAT refund rates were cut to 5% (Cai Shui (2007) No.90). The export tax 
refund rate of aluminum since then is maintained at 0%-5% in China. Increase of the export VAT 
refund rates was conceded at the end of 2008 for a small range of special aluminum products 
considered as intensive in labor13.  
Export tax was first given on electrolytic aluminum at the beginning of 2005 at a tentative 
rate of 5%. This rate was augmented to 15% in November 2006. In 2007, only three types of 
aluminum products (HS codes 76011090, 76020000 and 7604100014) were imposed an export tax, 
at 15%. Another aluminum product was hit the 15% export tax in 2008 (HS 76042990). Two other 
products (76012000 and 76041010 at 15%) were to be taxed as exported good in December 2008 
as the new 2009 Chinese tariff was unveiled. A reduction from 15% to 5% was decided in 
December 2008 for only one aluminum commodity (HS 76042910). Figure 13 encapsulates the 
changes in China’s Aluminum export taxes between 2003 and 2009, as figure 8 did for steel. 
 
                                                             
12
 Among which the export VAT refund rate of commodities under HS codes 7601 and 7602 were 8% and others were fixed at 13%.  
13
 The export VAT refund rate on HS codes 7606112000-7606920000 were augmented to 13% (Cai Shui (2008) No.144). 
14
 Export tax on HS 76041000 became valid from august 2007, announced by the circular of China Custom House (2007) No.38.  
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Figure 14 Export tariff benefit changes, China aluminum 2003-2009 
Unit: %. Source: authors calculation according to China’s export tariff changes. 
 
3.2.2 Effects 
Changes in aluminum export volume after VAT refund and export taxes reductions were 
passed are visible on figure 14 and 15, especially during the 2005 and 2007 years of plummeting 
export growth. Yet “visibility” should not be taken as a synonymous of “causality”, figures 14 and 
15 providing only qualitative information at this stage. 
 
Figure 15 Monthly aluminum exports 2003-2008 
Unit: 1000 tons. Source: China Custom House 
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Figure 16 Monthly growth rate of aluminum export 2003-2008 (month over the same month one year before) 
Unit: %. Source: China Custom House  
 
3.3 Cement 
China is world largest producer of cement, with more than 1 gigaton produced per year on 
average since 2005 (figure 16). China's cement production saw a slower growth at 2.8 percent 
year on year to about 1.3 billion tons in 2008, according to estimates of the Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology (figure 17).  
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Figure 17 World cement production, 2004-2007 
 
Figure 18 Annual cement production, 1991-2007 
Unit: million tons. Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.  
 
Cement export (HS2523) accounts generally for less than 1% of its production in China, as in 
most producing countries – trade being a very tiny part of world cement output. Unlike 
production which expands at a relatively stable pace, China’s cement export increased 
tremendously in 2005 and 2006, before experiencing a slight decrease in 2007 (figure 19). China’s 
cement exports by destination countries are given by figure 20. 
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Figure 19 China’s cement production and export growth rate, 2003-2007 
Unit: %. Source: China Custom House and National Bureau of Statistics. 
 
 
 
Figure 20  China’s cement export by destination countries 2003-2008. 
Unit: 1000 tons (left), million dollars (right). Source: China Custom House. 
 
3.3.1 Export VAT refund 
The export VAT refund abatement in cement sector was first implemented in September 
2006, with a reduction from its former level of 13% to 8% pursuant to the circular Cai Shui (2006) 
No. 139. The export VAT refund was set to 0 in July 2007 (Cai Shui (2007) No. 90) and remained at 
the 0% level ever since (figure 21).  
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Figure 21 Tariff cost in cement sector 
Unit: %. Sources: calculated from each year’s tariff. 
 
3.3.2 Effects 
China’s cement exports being highly volatile both in magnitude and destination over years, 
the visual information conveyed by export growth monthly changes become even harder to 
interpret than in the case of steel and aluminum (figure 22). 
 
 
Figure 22 Monthly cement exports 2004-2008 
Unit: 1000 tons.  
 
4. Assessing the cost of export restricting measures with EU-ETS quota price 
equivalent 
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We assess in this section the energy consumption-induced CO2 emissions of steel, 
aluminum and cement exports from China. Though significant CO2 emissions may arise from 
other (direct) sources than energy consumption in the industrial process, we restrict to 
energy-consumption related emissions, for at least two reasons. The first one points to the share 
of direct and indirect (energy consumption) CO2 emissions in steel, aluminium and cement 
processes. With power generated almost exclusively by coal, electricity consumption-induced 
CO2 emissions take the lion’s share in steel and aluminium production (the case of cement is 
different, as we’ll see below)15. The second reason points to relevance. The rationale for curbing 
exports in the sectors considered is given by the long-term official objective of energy cost 
effectiveness and energy efficiency increase across energy intensive sectors. How much energy 
was saved by VAT refund reductions and export taxes is the specific question underlying China’s 
initiative. Its translation from an overall, climate change – and certainly European perspective 
becomes how much CO2 was avoided thanks to the export-embedded energy consumption 
saved. A proxy of this figure is given below by the EU-ETS quota price equivalent of the export 
restriction efforts made by China. Contemplating the scenario European importers have to buy 
emission permits in the EU-ETS quota market for their imports of steel, aluminum and cement, 
we calculate the CO2 EU-ETS price equivalent of export taxes, including VAT refund cuts. 
We use the following simple equations:  
𝐶 = 𝑝 ×
𝑎
1+𝑎
     [1] 
where C is the unit tariff cost of export, p is the average price which is obtained by dividing 
the total export value by the total export quantity for the products considered, a is the average 
tariff cost (including VAT refund) in percentage terms.  
The quota cost (or price) of one export unit is given by:  
𝐶′ = 𝑝′ × 𝑏 × 𝑒     [2] 
where p’ is the EU-ETS quota price, b is the average energy consumption for one production 
unit, and e=2.38 is the CO2 emission per unit of standard coal consumption. Equalizing the two 
equations, we derive the equivalent quota price as 
𝑝′ =
𝑝×𝑎
(1+𝑎)×𝑏×𝑒
    [3] 
For steel, we use 2007 data and take the average euro/dollar exchange rate of 1.3, an 
estimated energy consumption of 632.12 kgce per ton of steel (China Steel Association) and an 
average export steel price of 645.7 $/t.   
                                                             
15
 The International Aluminium Institute provides world average estimates of 0.6% of global GHG emissions resulting from primary 
aluminium production excluding electricity and 1.4% including electricity – figures which in China need to be adjusted in favour of 
electricity consumption-related emissions (electricity is produced mainly from coal-fired power plants). For steel, the structure of 
emissions mirrors energy use in China, with coal and coke dominating, followed by electricity, then fossil liquids, and a small amount 
of natural gas (Price, Sinton, Worrell, Phylipsen, Hu and Li, 2001). 
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The energy consumption rate of aluminum in 2007 was 14488kwh/t. Each kwh consumes 
360 g of standard coal (NDRC). The steel sector’s average energy consumed per ton of aluminum 
rises hence to 5216 kgce. The average export price in 2007 was 3291.5 $/t. 
For cement, we use a modified formula so as to account also for the CO2 emitted during the 
production process, in addition to energy consumption. We use the formula of Li (2008) 
according to which the production of one ton of clinker emits one ton of CO2. With the average 
export price of cement in 2007 at 34.86 $/t, the quota cost (or price) takes the following simple 
form: 
C′ = p′  
Table 2 provide estimates of the EU-ETS quota price equivalent of a range of 10 average 
export tariffs (a in equation [1]) . 
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Table 2  Estimates of EU-ETS quota price equivalent for various levels of export tax 
 
Unit: euro/ton.  
 
Applied tariffs in 2006-2008 (a varying between 10% and 15% on average) would be hence 
equivalent as a EU-ETS quota price ranging between 30 and 43 euros per ton of CO2 for steel, 18 
and 26 euros per ton of CO2 for aluminium, and between 2.5 and 3.5 euros per ton of CO2 for 
cement. 
5. Discussion of results 
Our estimates provide a proxy of the plausible efforts made by China to reduce its CO2 
emissions embedded in steel, aluminium and cement exports. Our figures indicate that the 
EU-ETS quota price equivalent charged to Chinese exporters amount to 43 euros per ton of CO2 
for steel, 26 euros per ton of CO2 for aluminium and a mere 4 euros per ton of CO2 for cement, 
on the basis of a 15% average export tax (including export tax as such plus VAT refund). Two sets 
of question arise, the first related to the figures, the second to their meanings.  
5.1 Limitations due to calculation methods and data 
We calculate the EU-ETS quota price equivalent on the basis of the coal burnt to produce the 
steel, aluminium and cement exported. Several limitations should be kept in mind.  
Firstly, we have used the energy (coal) consumption per unit of product without 
distinguishing sub-categories by pollution levels or tax rates applied at several HS digits. The 
quota price equivalent is hence a rough estimate. 
Secondly, estimates would need to be revised downward, to account for both (non-energy) 
direct and indirect effects. Indeed, the more CO2 emissions embedded in the exported products 
considered, the lower the EU-ETS quota price equivalent for a given level of export tax. Still, 
correcting for some direct (non-energy consumption related) effect should leave our estimates in 
the range of 15-25 euros per ton (cement excepted). 
Thirdly, we did not correct for the potential world price and EU-ETS CO2 price changes, nor 
for their possible effect on competitiveness and leakage. Our estimates of EU import demand 
elasticity suggest that Chinese exporters face a rigid import demand and are hence price makers. 
Curbing exports should hence lead to a world price increase (in comparison with the case of a 
5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
Steel 15.72 30.01 43.06 55.02 66.03 76.19 85.59 94.33 102.46 110.05
Aluminum 9.71 18.54 26.6 33.99 40.79 47.07 52.88 58.27 63.3 67.99
Cement 1.28 2.44 3.5 4.47 5.36 6.19 6.95 7.66 8.32 8.94
Tariff cost
Equivalent q ota price
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small country setting up the same export taxes) and in turn, to a relaxing of the competitiveness 
pressure faced by EU industry. According to our calculus, the purchase of an average 2 million 
emission quotas by EU importers would have been needed to offset the CO2 price disadvantage 
of EU producers of steel, aluminium and cement on Chinese exports. This represents 1% of 2006 
EU-ETS allowances, whose addition over years ends up making a significant amount of the overall 
reduction effort expected from EU firms.  
5.2 What do our estimates really mean? 
Are export restrictions part of a “firm commitment to reducing” GHG emissions? As already 
mentioned, export taxes are designed as part of an energy saving package, and not climate 
change policies as such, at least explicitly. Further, it would seem needed to separate temporary 
and long-lasting measures, the former being a weak proof of a “firm commitment”. Still, several 
arguments militate for export taxes to be considered as structural parts of an energy efficiency 
deal, and hence as a firm commitment to reducing GHG emissions. 
Export tax and export VAT refund abating are set up to reduce the use of energy and natural 
resources whose domestic price is below market prices. The huge amount of exports of such 
products occurs at the cost of tremendous government energy or input based subsidies. This 
indeed helps to relax the energy tension in China. But it also helps to reorganize the production 
structure towards higher value-added and/or energy-efficient products. Higher export taxes or 
export VAT refund rate reductions are imposed on products with high polluting rate and low 
value-added. This happens along with the implementation of domestic policies closing small and 
energy-wasting factories, or at least restricting their number. All these initiatives belong to one of 
the key development objectives of China, namely energy efficiency. A reduction of 20% of energy 
consumption per unit of GDP from 2006 to the end of 2010 was officially defined in the 11th Five 
Year Plan and in the energy (2007) and climate change (2008) white papers. Though pessimism 
has been prevailing so far for the poor achievement of this plan, more stringent domestic policies 
are expected to be approved in the immediate future so as to achieve energy efficiency 
objectives by 2010. We may consider, implicitly, that export tax and VAT refund abating in China 
incorporate climate change concerns and efforts because of their contribution to higher energy 
efficiency. 
What is the effect of export taxes on domestic production, and in turn, on GHG overall 
emissions from China? Trade is a minor part of sectoral emissions. The use of tax revenues and 
the effective implementation of complementary (energy efficiency) domestic measures will be 
key factors to both climate change mitigation and the more diplomatic demonstration that firm 
commitment indeed occur to “an extent comparable to that of the EU”. 
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6. Conclusion 
Three questions are related to Chinese export taxes on energy-intensive products. The 
commitment itself from China, the magnitude (comparability) of such commitment, and its 
stability (firmness) over time.  
1. The commitment issue or why and for what does China resort to export taxes? Our 
findings suggest that China did not set any strategy of export led growth on the products 
considered. On the contrary, the proof was repeatedly given – through official statements – of its 
willingness to shutter energy-inefficient factories, in a context of world import demand rising 
faster than domestic capacity changes (China acting in world market as a “production capacity 
reservoir” necessary to bridge the world supply-demand gap). Last, export taxes enabled China to 
manipulate the terms of trade and reap off trade benefits through an export price increase. 
All these three factors combine into a win-win-win scenario: energy saving, the 
modernization of production domestic processes, and export overall value gains were three 
interlinked objectives that the export tax helped China meet.  
As a consequence, no commitment on climate change as such – particularly in EU terms 
where emissions reduction target should be made explicitly – can be formally associated with 
Chinese export taxes. This said, it may be worth recalling that that shuttering plants to reach 
formal emission targets can leave the marginal production cost unchanged (case of clinker in 
China with excess energy-intensive and energy inefficient capacities) and hence be of limited help 
to internalize CO2 price. Conversely, taxing exports without emission reduction targets can lead 
to energy efficiency increase, and in turn climate change mitigation, even though it does not 
appear as formal commitment to cut GHG emissions. Overall, export taxes (VAT refund cuts 
included) should be considered as part of a commitment from China toward higher energy 
efficiency. And in turn, although not explicitly, toward climate change mitigation 
2. The comparability issue or does China’s commitment fit into the same magnitude range as 
Europe’s? 
Our estimates shows that the CO2 price embedded in aluminium and steel (after correcting 
roughly for CO2 process-related emissions) in China’s exports lies in the same range as EU-ETS 
average expected price (20-30 € per ton). For these two products, the energy saved in China and 
the emissions avoided in the EU occur at a comparable value of CO2 price. 
This is not true for cement. In this case, the energy saving objective of China and the 
emissions reduction of the EU cannot be compared, unless export taxes (on a low value product 
such as clinker) reaches levels of several hundred percents. Setting VAT refund to 0 on cement 
export might suffice to reach domestic objectives (reduce profit margins, propel modernisation 
toward energy efficient plants) but according to our estimates, the negative externality 
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associated with exports are far from being priced at their EU CO2 price equivalent level.  
Overall, taxing excess-energy embedded in exports (China approach) and taxing negative 
externality (EU approach) are two different processes, which match in the case of steel and 
aluminium, but not in the case of cement 
3. The firmness issue or is China’s commitment stable over time?  
Export tax are more temporary devices than VAT refund cuts, the latter pointing to long term 
objectives of energy efficiency and upgrading of Chinese exports. A subsidiary question can be 
raised as follows: can Chinese export taxes help build up a climate deal between China and the 
EU? 
Positive answers come from the fact that China is price maker in the three markets 
considered, with a significant effect of its export policies on world prices and hence on EU 
competitiveness. Indeed, opportunities for new comers in world market to offset China’s export 
reductions and supply the EU seem rather limited. This confers a particular position to China, 
whose unwillingness to expand its GDP through exports of energy-intensive products could hence 
possibly satisfy EU competitiveness concerns and EU demand to limit imports growth on ETS 
products. Whether or not remaining imports in the EU should still be charged EU-ETS CO2 price 
depends on the definition of “leakage” chosen. Should we depart from the issues of 
“commitment”, “comparability” and “firmness” addressed in this paper and consider instead 
leakage as emission reductions not passed onto EU-ETS CO2 price, then the purchase of emission 
credits by European importers remains a necessary condition for CO2 price to signal the scarcity 
negotiated inside EU.  
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